The PT PAL Corruption Saga: Former Director Saiful Anwar Challenges Conviction via Judicial Review

The downfall of top executives at PT Penataran Angkatan Laut (PT PAL), Indonesia's premier state-owned shipbuilder, remains one of the most high-profile corruption cases in the country’s maritime industry. Saiful Anwar, the former Director of Design and Technology who also served as Finance Director between 2012 and 2017, is now making a final stand. Currently serving a four-year sentence at the Porong Special Class IA Prison in Sidoarjo, Anwar has officially filed for a Judicial Review (Peninjauan Kembali or PK) at the Surabaya Tipikor Court, seeking to challenge the legal basis of his 2017 conviction.

The 2017 Sting Operation and the SSV Project

To understand the current legal battle, we must look back at the events of March 30, 2017. A coordinated sting operation (OTT) by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) caught Arif Cahyana (General Manager of PT PAL) and Agus Nugroho (Director of PT Perusa Sejati) in Jakarta. The trigger was a cash handover of USD 25,000—a small fraction of a much larger scheme. This led to the immediate arrest of PT PAL’s then-President Director, M. Firmansyah Arifin, and Saiful Anwar the following day.

At the heart of the scandal was the Strategic Sealift Vessel (SSV) project, involving the construction of two warships for the Philippine government, valued at over USD 86.9 million. The court discovered that a 4.75% agency fee was negotiated with Ashanty Sales Inc., a Philippine-based agent. However, only 3.5% was a legitimate fee; the remaining 1.25% was designated as "cashback" intended for PT PAL’s board, funneled through intermediaries like Kirana Kotama and PT Perusa Sejati.

The 'Dana Komando' Dilemma: An Open Secret?

During his PK hearing on July 30, 2018, Saiful Anwar presented a narrative that shifts the blame from individual greed to systemic failure. He argued that the USD 25,000 and other previous payments—including a USD 163,000 installment in 2015—were never intended for personal enrichment. Instead, these funds were part of a "Dana Komando" (Command Fund), an unofficial but allegedly mandatory contribution to the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) to ensure smooth project payments and future contracts.

Anwar’s defense highlights a staggering claim: for every TNI AL project, PT PAL was allegedly required to prepare 2% to 8% of the contract value as a Command Fund. Because these payments had no official receipts, the management resorted to marking up contracts with vendors and agents like Ashanty Sales. According to Anwar, this practice was an "institutional action" known not only by the Board of Directors but also by the Board of Commissioners and high-ranking officials within the Ministry of SOEs (BUMN).

Challenging the Legal Articles

In his PK memorandum, which he read personally without a lawyer, Anwar raised a critical legal point regarding the specific articles used to convict him. He was sentenced under Article 12 of the Anti-Corruption Law, which pertains to bribery. However, Anwar argues that based on expert testimony, Article 3—concerning the abuse of authority resulting in state loss—is more appropriate.

He contends that the money received was actually PT PAL’s own funds that had been "parked" with partners to facilitate the Command Fund. Therefore, he argues it cannot be defined as a bribe from an outside party. Furthermore, Anwar pointed out a significant procedural flaw in his original trial: the KPK failed to present key witnesses from Ashanty Sales and the TNI AL, meaning the full context of the "Command Fund" was never truly examined in court.

A Tale of Two Defenses

The original trial also featured a poignant defense from M. Firmansyah Arifin, the former President Director. Arifin described himself as an outsider (the only director not from the internal ranks) who found it impossible to stop the deeply rooted Command Fund system. He claimed that failing to pay these funds would result in stalled project payments, potentially paralyzing PT PAL’s operations and its ability to pay thousands of employees.

Arifin and Anwar both maintained that not a single cent of the cashback was used for personal gain. They argued that the system was so "autopilot" that the collection and distribution of these funds occurred with minimal directorial intervention. Despite these pleas, the judges in 2017 remained firm, sentencing the trio to four years in prison, citing that while the system might have been pre-existing, their participation in it constituted a criminal act.

The Road Ahead for the Judicial Review

Saiful Anwar’s move to file for PK is a gamble to clear his name or at least reduce the severity of his legal standing. While Firmansyah Arifin and Arif Cahyana have not yet followed suit, the outcome of Anwar’s petition could have significant implications for how corporate corruption and systemic "administrative fees" are handled in Indonesia.

Following the reading of the memorandum, the Surabaya Tipikor Court will forward the case to the Supreme Court in Jakarta. As Saiful Anwar continues his sentence, the case serves as a grim reminder of the complex, often murky intersection between state-owned enterprise management, defense procurement, and institutionalized corruption.